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THE DILEMMA OF A DEFENDANT WITNESS
IN NEW YORK: THE IMPEACHMENT
PROBLEM HALF-SOLVED
One of the most important tasks of any jury is to listen to and
evaluate the testimony of witnesses called by either side. In deter-
mining whether or not to believe a particular witness, the jury may
consider the reasonableness of his story, his demeanor on the
stand, and any weaknesses in his testimony exposed on cross-
examination.' As a further test of credibility, a witness may be
impeached2 by the introduction of evidence concerning his prior
convictions 3 and by interrogation regarding his prior specific acts
of misconduct.4 This additional information concerning the wit-
ness' past life is intended to provide some evidence of the witness'
character and thereby better enable the jury to decide whether he
is worthy of belief.
5
A defendant in a criminal trial who chooses to take the stand
in his own behalf is, in his capacity as a witness, also subject to such
impeachment. 6 Thus, the prosecution's case, which is normally
limited to establishing only the elements of the crimes charged, 7 is
extended, under the rules of impeachment, to include proof of the
I Form No. 21, in I J. DowsEY, CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO CHARGE IN A
CRIMINAL CASE 3-24 (1968).
' In New York, the credibility of an opponent's witness may be impeached by:
1. Showing [the witness'] general bad reputation for truth and veracity;
2. Interrogating him on cross-examination concerning any immoral, vicious, or
criminal act of his life which may affect his character and tend to show that he is not
worthy of belief;
3. Showing that he has made statements on other occasions which are inconsistent
with his present testimony;
4. Showing his bias in favor of the party callin him, his hostility towards the party
against whom he is testifying, or his interest in the case;
5. Showing that he has been convicted of a crime;
6. Showing that, either at the time of the occurrences to which he has testified or at
the time of giving testimony, he was under the influence of drugs or liquor or was
ill or mentally deranged.
W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 493 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973) [hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON].
' See text accompanying notes 26-34 infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 12-25 infra.
* The underlying rationale for these methods of impeachment is the belief that
(w]hat a person is often determines whether he should be believed.... No sufficient
reason appears why the jury should not be informed what sort of person is asking
them to take his word. In transactions of everyday life this is probably the first thing
they would wish to know.
State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).
6 See, e.g., People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 326 N.E.2d 804, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1975);
People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974); People v.
Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247 N.E.2d 642, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846
(1969); People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950).
7 See People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901).
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defendant's prior convictions and questions regarding his previous
acts of misconduct. Consequently, a jury verdict on a defendant's
guilt or innocence as to the present charges may in such cases be
heavily influenced by the jurrs' knowledge of the defendant's guilt
or impropriety on previous occasions.
Many jurisdictions have struggled with the conflict inherent in
the jury's dual function of evaluating credibility based upon a
defendant witness' past conduct and rendering a verdict based only
upon evidence relevant to the crime presently charged. 8 In People
v. Sandoval9 the New York Court of Appeals, by limiting the evi-
dence which will be admissible for impeachment purposes and
instituting pretrial procedures which give the defendant advance
notice of evidence to be introduced at trial, for the first time both
recognized the problem and tried its hand at a solution. While
Sandoval was at first enthusiastically hailed as an addition "to the
illustrious list of constitutional safeguards joining such company as
Miranda, Wade, Huntley and others,"'1 it now appears that this
reception to the court's attempted reform was unduly optimistic.
An examination of post-Sandoval lower court decisions reveals that
many of the problems found in the process of impeaching a
defendant witness remain unsolved.".
IMPEACHMENT OF A WITNESS IN NEW YORK
Prior Acts
In New York a witness may generally be cross examined con-
cerning any immoral, vicious, or criminal act which may affect his
character and show him unworthy of belief.'2 The acts shown need
I One of the first courts to recognize and attempt to deal with the problems involved in
impeaching a defendant witness through the use of his past conduct was the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). For examples of subsequent federal and state court approaches to the problem
see United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969),
State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971), and State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,
228 A.2d 682 (1967).
34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
1o People v. Mallard, 78 Misc. 2d 858, 859, 358 N.Y.S.2d 913, 914 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1974).
11 See notes 93-113 and accompanying text infra.
'
2 See, e.g., People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247 N.E.2d 642, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817
(1969); People v. Hurst, 10 N.Y.2d 939, 179 N.E.2d 861, 224 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1961) (mem.);
People v. Johnston, 228 N.Y. 332, 127 N.E. 186 (1920); People v. Giblin, 115 N.Y. 196, 21
N.E. 1062 (1889). See generally RICHARDSON, supra note 2, § 498; E. FISCH, NEW YORK
EVIDENCE § 455 (1959); 3 L. FRUMER & E. BISKIND, BENDER'S NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 141
(1974); G. MoTTLA, NEW YORK EVIDENCE PROOF OF CASES § 437 (2d ed. 1966); 2 L. PAPERNO
& A. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK § 30 (rev. ed. 1971).
[Vol. 50:129
DILEMMA OF DEFENDANT WITNESS
not have been the subject of a criminal prosecution or any legal
action at all provided they have some bearing on the credibility of
the witness or are indicative of "moral turpitude."' 3 While the
ultimate issue of credibility is always left to the jury, 14 the court
initially determines the admissibility of such evidence.'- The appel-
lant who seeks a reversal of a trial judge's decision on this matter
has the heavy burden of showing an abuse of discretion. 16
In most instances, the trial court will not permit cross-
examination beyond the broad perimeter of the "moral turpitude"
standard. Although moral turpitude has never been precisely de-
fined by the courts, acts revealing dishonesty, lack of moral princi-
ple, or disregard for the truth are usually ruled proper subjects for
cross-examination.' 7 Conversely, it has been held reversible error
to question a witness concerning nonpayment of rent' 8 or expul-
sion from a church 19 since such acts do not necessarily demonstrate
negative traits in a person's moral character. Questions concerning
previous arrests20 or indictments2' are similarly excluded since
neither arrest nor indictment carries a presumption of guilt or
wrongdoing on the part of the witness.
13 People v. Montlake, 184 App. Div. 578, 583, 172 N.Y.S. 102, 106 (2d Dep't 1918).
" See People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 159 N.E.2d 549, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, cert. denied,
361 U.S. 920 (1959), wherein the court, excluding expert testimony to the effect that drug
addicts are often pathological liars, emphasized that credibility is solely a jury question.
15 See cases cited note 12 supra.
16See People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950), in which the court stated
that
although there may be room for a difference of opinion as to the scope and extent
of cross-examination, the wide latitude and the broad discretion that must be
vouchsafed to the trial judge ... precludes this court, in the absence of "plain abuse
and injusiice," . . . from substituting its judgment for his and from making that
difference of opinion, in the difficult and ineffable realm of discretion, a basis for
reversal.
Id. at 202, 93 N.E.2d at 640 (citations omitted).
17 For a collection of cases illustrating the types of acts admissible under the moral
turpitude rule, see 3 L. FRUNMER & E. BISKIND, BENDER'S NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 141 (1974).
18 People v. Montlake, 184 App. Div. 578, 583, 172 N.Y:S. 102, 106 (2d Dep't 1918).
10 People v. Dorthy, 20 App. Div. 308, 322, 46 N.Y.S. 970, 979 (4th Dep't 1897), affd,
156 N.Y. 237, 50 N.E. 800 (1898).20 See, e.g., People v. McKinley, 39 App. Div. 2d 749, 332 N.Y.S.2d 154 (2d Dep't 1972)
(mem.) (questioning concerning eight prior arrests held reversible error even though three
of these had in fact resulted in conviction); People v. Jusino, 10 App. Div. 2d 618, 196
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1st Dep't 1960) (mem.) (questioning concerning an arrest that occurred
during a disturbance in a public park held reversible error).21 See, e.g., People v. Morrison, 195 N.Y. 116, 88 N.E. 21 (1909) (questioning defen-
dant's witness concerning his own indictment for a larceny similar to that for which the
defendant was then on trial considered improper); People v. Korn, 40 App. Div. 2d 561, 334
N.Y.S.2d 115 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.) (questioning defendant concerning counts of an
indictment dismissed for insufficient evidence held reversible error); People v. Branch, 34
App. Div. 2d 541, 309 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.), affdper curiam, 27 N.Y.2d 834,
265 N.E.2d 457, 316 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1970) (questioning defendant concerning indictment for
crimes similar to crime for which he was on trial held reversible error).
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In all cases, the sole purpose of cross-examination as to prior
acts of misconduct is to impeach the credibility of the witness;
therefore, questioning for any other purpose is impermissible. 22
The cross-examining attorney is held to a standard of "good faith,"
requiring not only that his questions have a basis in fact, but also
that the length and manner of questioning be reasonable and not
overly prejudicial. 23 Moreover, since it is feared that the introduc-
tion of independent evidence of prior vicious, criminal, or immoral
acts will cause the multiplication of collateral issues which might
confuse the jury, proof of such acts is limited to admissions elicited
on cross-examination. 24 Although the cross-examiner may inquire
further as to a particular act or repeat a question hoping to obtain
an affirmative answer,2 5 he is ultimately bound by a witness' denial
and may not introduce evidence to contradict the responses given.
Prior Convictions
The same reasoning that permits impeachment by prior acts
underlies the rule allowing impeachment by evidence of prior
convictions, 26 namely the jury is entitled to know the type of person
22 It is not the purpose of cross-examination to create suspicion and mistrust in the
minds of the jurors. See People v. Slover, 232 N.Y. 264,133 N.E. 633 (1921) (per curiam).
Nor should cross-examination be used to instill prejudice. In this regard, courts will often
scrutinize the length and manner of an attorney's cross-examination. See, e.g., People v.
Malkin, 250 NY. 185, 164 N.E. 900 (1928) (confronting defendant on cross-examination
with seven witnesses and phrasing questions in such a way as to suggest that defendant's
denials were false held reversible error); People v. Redmond, 265 App. Div. 307, 38
N.Y.S.2d 727- (3d Dep't 1942) (detailed interrogation about the burning of three other
buildings in cross-examination of 18-year-old defendant charged with arson held reversible
error since the questions unavoidably raised a presumption of guilt in the minds of the
jurors). In some cases the very content of the evidence introduced on cross-examination is
found to be overly prejudicial- See, e.g., People v. Bilanchuck, 280 App. Div. 180, 112
N.Y.S.2d 4t4 (1st Dep't 1952) (exposure of defendant's entire record as a police officer,
which included allegations of defendant's use of foul language, absence from post, participa-
tion in barroom, fights, and making of unnecessary arrests held unduly prejudicial).
See People v. Schrvartz man, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 244, 247 N.E.2d 642, 644, 299 N.Y.S.2d
817, 820 (1969).24 See, e.g., People v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530, 260 N.E.2d 529, 311 N.Y.S.2d 892
(1970); People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E-2d 637 (1950); People v. Nuzzo, 294 N.Y. 227,
62 N.E.2d 47 (1945); People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930).
25 People v. Sch'wartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 244, 247 N.E.2d 642, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817
(1969). In People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93 N.E.2d 637 (1950), the defendant, who was on
trial for performing an abortion, was questioned about other abortions she allegedly per-
formed. Despite the defendant's denial of the allegations, the State was permitted to pursue
this line of questioning and inquire further as to whether she had signed a statement
admitting that she had performed another abortion and whether she had been present while
others performed such an operation.26 See, e.g., People v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530, 260 N.E.2d 529, 311 N.Y.S.2d 892
(1970); People v. Russell, 266 N.Y. 147, 194 N.E. 65 (1934).
In a criminal prosecution, New York permits the impeachment of a witness by evidence
of a prior conviction for any offense. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 60.40 (McKinney 1971). In a
civil action, such impeachment is limited to the use of evidence of prior criminal convictions,
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who, by taking the stand, is asking to be believed. 21 Prior conviction
is not considered a collateral matter and thus may be proven by
evidence independent of an admission from the witness on cross-
examination. 28 Indeed, even if a witness denies the fact of convic-
tion, the cross-examiner's right to introduce the witness' prior rec-
ord into evidence is unaffected.2 9
The scope of judicial discretion in this area is extremely lim-
ited. Proof of convictions for felonies and misdemeanors is
routinely introduced. 30 In addition, the court of appeals has re-
cently indicated that convictions for violations may be used for
impeachment purposes. 31 Most traffic offenses, however, may not
be used to impeach a witness. 2 Youthful offender adjudications,
which do not result in criminal convictions, are also inadmissible. 3
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4513 (McKinney 1963), crime being defined in the Penal Law as a
felony or misdemeanor. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney 1975). See generally
RICHARDSON, Supra note 2, § 506; E. FIscH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 459 (1959); 3 L. FRUMER
& E. BISKIND, BENDER'S NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 146 (1974); G. MOTrLA, NEW YORK EVIDENCE
PROOF OF CASES § 439 (2d ed. 1966); 2 L. PAPERNO & A. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN
NEW YORK § 34 (rev. ed. 1971).2 7 See note 5 supra.
28 N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 60A0(1) (McKinney 1971) provides in pertinent part:
If in the course of a criminal proceeding, any witness, including a defendant, is
properly asked whether he was previously convicted of a specified offense and
answers in the negative or in an equivocal manner, the party adverse to the one who
called him may independently prove such conviction.
29 If in response to proper inquiry whether he has ever been convicted of any
offense, the witness answers in the negative or in an equivocal manner, the adverse
party may independently prove any previous conviction of the witness.
Id. 30 See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d 720, 348 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1973); People v. Killian, 74 Misc. 2d 120, 344 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Nassau County Ct.
1973).
31 See People v. Gray, 34 N.Y.2d 903, 316 N.E.2d 719, 359 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1974), afJfg
mem. 41 App. Div. 2d 125, 341 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dep't 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1055
(1974). N.Y. CrIM. PRO. LAW § 60.40(1) (McKinney 1971), which permits the impeachment
of a witness by evidence of a prior conviction for any "offense," has led to some confusion
since it would seem to allow impeachment of a witness in a criminal prosecution by proof of
a conviction for an offense not a crime. Adopting this view, the Gray court permitted
impeachment of a defendant by proof of a conviction for harassment, which is only a
violation. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 1975). This approach has been strongly
criticized, however, and the weight of authority seems to favor the view that the drafters of
§ 60.40 did not intend to so extend the boundaries of impeachment. See 20 N.Y. JuD. CONF.
ANN. REP. 236-37 (1975); 19 N.Y. JUD. CONF. ANN. REP. A69-70 (1974); RICHARDSON, supra
note 2, § 506.
32 N.Y. VEH. & TlAF. LAW § 155 (McKinney Supp. 1975) specifically states:
A traffic infraction is not a crime and the punishment imposed therefor shall not be
deemed for any purpose a penal or criminal punishment and shall not affect or
impair the credibility as a witness or otherwise of any person convicted thereof.
Relying on this statute, the court, in People v. Oliver, 80 Misc. 2d 905, 365 N.Y.S.2d 422
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975), refused to permit cross-examination of the defendant
concerning three prior motor vehicle convictions.
33 See People v. Vidal, 26 N.Y.2d 249, 257 N.E.2d 886, 309 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1970); People
v. Sarra, 283 App. Div. 876, 129 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1954) (mem.),aff'd in part, 308 N.Y.
302, 125 N.E.2d 580 (1955). It is permissible, however, to question the witness concerning
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Similarly, a juvenile proceeding occurring before the family court
may not be used against a witness in any other court. 4 Beyond
these limited exceptions, however, courts have been less than dis-
criminate in permitting the use, in cross-examination, of evidence
from a witness' prior record, often disregarding its relevance to the
witness' credibility.
IMPEACHMENT COMPLICATED: THE DEFENDANT WITNESS
The Q)uestion of Relevance
At common law conviction of any infamous crime rendered a
witness incompetent to testify.a5 Although this principle has be-
come obsolete, the underlying rationale continues as the basis for
modern rules of evidence. From the fact that a person has commit-
ted a criminal act in the past, the jury is permitted to infer that he
may be testifying falsely when he takes the stand. It seems reason-
able that such a damaging inference should be permitted only upon
a showing that there exists some rational or logical relationship
between commission of a criminal act in the past and a present
tendency to falsify.
It is especially important to determine whether prior convic-
tions or acts of misconduct are relevant to credibility when the
witness to be impeached is the defendant in a criminal prosecution.
The defendant's initial choice to either testify in his own behalf or
remain silent is often dictated by the nature of his prior record.3 6 If
he elects not to take the stand, the prosecutor may neither com-
ment on his silence37 nor refer to the existence or content of any
prior record.3 8 On the other hand, if the defendant chooses to
the misconduct underlying the youthful offender conviction. People v. Vidal, 26 N.Y.2d 249,
253, 257 N.E.2d 886, 889, 309 N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (1970). Practically speaking, then, this
exception affords little protection to the witness. As one court recently noted, cross-
examination concerning the underlying acts is merely "an indirect method of establishing
the commission of these crimes and give[s] rise to substantially the same prejudice as a
conviction itself." People v. Jackson, 79 Misc. 2d 814, 818, 361 N.Y.S.2d 258, 263 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1974).
34 See N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 781, 783 (McKinney 1963). In addition to § 781, which
states that no adjudication under the Act shall be considered a conviction, § 783 provides
that evidence from any stage of a family court proceeding is inadmissible in any other court
except for the purpose of sentencing an adult after conviction.
35 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (1954); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (3d ed. 1940).
36 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146 (1966). Statistics reveal that a
defendant without a record will testify 91% of the time. The rate drops to 74% where the
defendant has been previously convicted.
.3 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
38 When the defendant does not testify, the prosecution is effectively foreclosed from
introducing any prior record the defendant may have unless the fact of prior convictions or
criminal acts is independently admissible as proof of elements of the crime such as motive,
intent, or common scheme or plan. See People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286
[Vol. 50:129
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exercise his right to testify, the prosecutor will undoubtedly reveal
the defendant's entire prior record to the jury.39
The substantial risk of prejudice incurred by a defendant
witness is a factor which cannot be ignored in determining the
validity and reliability of impeachment procedures as a test of
credibility. It is undeniable that a jury will be much less favorably
disposed towards a defendant with a prior record than towards one
who can say that he has never been in trouble.40 The jury may
draw the inference that "he's done it once, he probably did it
again"41 or "once a criminal always a criminal." Some jurors might
even feel that an alleged second or third offender deserves to be
locked away regardless of his guilt or innocence of the particular
charges against him. In such cases, the possibility always exists that
a defendant will be convicted on the basis of past acts rather than
present guilt.
The prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence has been
documented in studies of jury behavior, and it has been demon-
strated that defendants whose prior record is revealed at trial have
a much lower chance of acquittal.42 Courts are well aware of this
phenomenon. Indeed, the effect of prior conviction evidence upon
the defendant's case has been described by one judge as "devastat-
ing. '43 Not surprisingly, therefore, prosecutors are reluctant to
relinquish such a powerful weapon.44
(1901). See generally N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 60.40(3) (McKinney 1971). See also Lacy,
Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged in the Indictment, 31 ORE. L. REv. 267 (1952);
Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REv. 325, 326-36 (1956); Trautman,
Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REv. 385, 403 (1952).
39 See note 6 supra.
40 Commentators unanimously agree that the use of a prior record to impeach a
defendant witness has a prejudicial effect. See, e.g., Spector, Impeaching the Defendint by His
Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps
Backward, 1 LoYoLA U.L.J. 247, 249-50 (1970); Note, Impeaching the Accused by His Prior
Crimes-A New Approach to an Old Problem, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 919, 922-24 (1968); Note,
Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the
Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 168, 170-80
(1968).
41 Where the conviction or criminal act introduced to impeach the defendant is similar
to the offense charged, see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d 471, 347 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1973) (hearing ordered); People v. Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d 720, 348
N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1973) (posthearing determination); People v. Ander-
son, 31 Misc. 2d 863, 222 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Westchester County Ct. 1961), the probability that
the jury will draw this inference is likely to increase.
42 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160-61 (1966). In their analysis of the
effect of the strength of the prosecution's case and disclosure of a defendant's prior record,
the authors discovered that if they "take the average of the cases where the defendant has no
record as against the cases where he has a record, the acquittal rate declines from 42 to 25
percent." Id. at 161.
43 Interview with Judge Richard E. Edstrom, District Court of Nassau County, Mineola,
New York, in chambers, July 15, 1975.
44Id.
19751
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Ideally, impeachment procedures should incorporate some
mechanism for distinguishing between prior acts that are relevant
to credibility and acts that demonstrate character traits which are in
no way related to truthfulness. Certainly many unascertainable
subjective factors influence a defendant's decision to tell the truth
in court. Psychological data on the relationship between past crimi-
nal behavior and a present tendency towards dishonesty are at best
inconclusive. 45 Indeed, one of the most influential factors coloring
a defendant's testimony at trial may well be his guilt or innocence
of the particular crime charged. The threat of a possible jail sen-
tence unquestionably fosters false testimony by many guilty defen-
dants irrespective of their prior records.46 An innocent defendant,
on the other hand, has an incentive to speak the truth. Neverthe-
less, consideration of this factor as well as the many social and
psychological motivations underlying a defendant's testimony is
admittedly beyond the province of a court.
There seem to exist, however, certain objective criteria, capa-
ble of incorporation into judicially created rules of impeachment,
which are helpful in determining whether particular prior behavior
is relevant in ascertaining credibility. The type of criminal behavior
involved is one such factor. For example, if a person has previously
engaged in conduct exhibiting dishonest or deceitful character
traits, one might logically assume that such behavior is relevant to
whether the person is now to be believed.47 Violent or impulsive
behavior, on the other hand, may reveal little about the honesty or
integrity of a person and thus be of dubious value to the jury in
judging credibility. Another relevant consideration should be the
remoteness of the acts sought to be introduced. The relationship
between past criminal behavior and a present propensity towards
falsehood is, it is suggested, further weakened by the passage of
time. Incidents that occurred during a person's youth may merely
indicate a troubled period in his life rather than an inherent lack of
" See Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions: A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the Proposed Rules of
Evidence for U.S. District Courts, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 330, 332 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Glick].
The author points out that while there have been no definitive studies on the relationship
between a criminal record and a tendency to falsify, available data seem to indicate that the
rationale permitting impeachment by prior conviction to be used as a test of credibility has
questionable support in psychological theory.
4 See Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J.
763, 774-78 (1961).
" The theory that admissible prior convictions should be limited to crimes involving
dishonesty, deceit, or untrustworthiness has received wide support. See, e.g., Cohen, Im-
peachment of a Defendant-Witness by Prior Conviction, 6 C~IM. L. BULL. 26 (1970); Glick, supra
note 45. See also UNIFORm RULE oF EviDENCE 21 (1965 version), which limits the scope of
impeachment to crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement."
[Vol. 50:129
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honesty. It seems clear, therefore, that since all prior acts do not
bear on credibility to the same degree, an approach that fails to
discriminate between the different types of behavior involved is
unjustified.
Constitutional Objections
In an era in which the constitutional guarantees afforded a
criminal defendant have been expanded to protect his rights at
trial,48 any evidentiary rule that threatens the exercise of those
rights appears deserving of close scrutiny. The constitutional ques-
tions raised by the admissibility of prior criminal acts or convictions
to impeach a defendant witness, therefore, merit serious considera-
tion.
A defendant might well argue that the prejudicial effect of
prior conviction evidence constitutes a deprivation of due process.
The Supreme Court has already held, in a different context, that a
defendant need not show specific detriment to himself to prevail
on a due process argument. 49 Rather, a showing that a particular
practice is inherently prejudicial may provide a sufficient basis for a
finding of unconstitutionality. The virtually indiscriminate use of
impeachment evidence by some courts, given its demonstrable prej-
udicial effect, certainly seems vulnerable to such a due process
attack. 50
Lack of a strong logical relationship between prior conviction
48 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigent defendant's right to
counsel on first appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel applies
to all state felony prosecutions); cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to
counsel at postindictment lineup for identification purposes); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (defendant must be informed of constitutional rights upon being taken into
custody).
49 In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Texas procedure permitting the televising
of a criminal trial within the discretion of the trial judge was attacked on due process
grounds. The State contended that since the defendant could establish no demonstrable
prejudice resulting from the use of television, his conviction must stand. The Court agreed
that this was the general rule, but rejected the need for a showing of prejudice in the instant
case, explaining that "at times a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability
that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process." Id. at 542-43.
Estes' conviction was reversed.
50 A denial of due process may also result when a specific constitutional right has been
abridged. Taking this approach, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has held that the use of prior
convictions to impeach the credibility of a defendant witness is an unreasonable burden on
his right to testify and therefore a denial of due process. State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254,
492 P.2d 657 (1971), noted in 25 VAND. L. REv. 918 (1972). During his trial for first degree
murder, Santiago was questioned about a prior burglary conviction. Balancing the relatively
slight probative value that prior convictions have on the issue of credibility against the
probability that the defendant with a prior record will forego his privilege to testify and that
the jury will use the impeaching evidence to determine the defendant's guilt of the crime
charged, the court concluded that the impeachment procedure was unconstitutional as
applied to a defendant witness and reversed the conviction.
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of crime and truthfulness on the stand may also give rise to an
equal protection problem. Although the equal protection clause
does not require identical treatment for all persons, it clearly man-
dates that any distinctions drawn be reasonably related to a legiti-
mate state goal.5 1 The use of prior convictions for impeachment
purposes creates two distinct classes of defendants. The prior of-
fender who testifies in his own behalf lessens his chances of acquit-
tal because of the potentially damaging effect exposure of prior
criminal acts and convictions may have upon a jury. A first offen-
der, however, does not suffer the same fear that the jury's evalua-
tion of his testimony, and presumably its ultimate verdict, will be
heavily influenced by factors extraneous to his guilt or innocence of
the crime charged. If the impeachment procedure furthered a
legitimate purpose, such as aiding the jury in assessing credibility,
the distinction between these two classes of defendants might be
justified. The propriety of the distinction is suspect, however, since
the premise upon which it is based-that prior acts are relevant to
credibility-is open to question.
Related to the due process and equal protection considerations
is the defendant's right, under the sixth amendment, to a fair trial
by an impartial jury.52 Although the amendment itself contains no
specific guidelines as to what constitutes an impartial jury, case law
indicates that any practice which affects the jury's ability to be
openminded on the question of guilt regarding a specific charge is
subject to scrutiny. Excessive pretrial publicity, for example, has
been held grounds for reversal of a defendant's conviction,5 3 since
it deprived him of a jury of impartial men and women who would
convict or acquit solely on the basis of evidence presented at trial.
In a case where the defendant is impeached by prior convictions or
criminal acts, there exists the similar danger that the jury will
convict, not solely on the basis of evidence of the defendant's guilt,
but because the disclosure of other extraneous facts which theoreti-
cally may be used only to gauge credibility has colored its decision.
51 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 532 (1942).
5 2 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466
(1965).
53 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Prior to his arrest for the murder of his
wife, numerous newspaper articles proclaimed the defendant guilty. The publicity increased
thereafter: the names and addresses of prospective jurors were published, and all jurors
reported receiving numerous telephone calls and letters in regard to the impending trial.
Both the jury selection and trial were extensively covered by the news media, and the
presence of numerous reporters interfered with the orderly conduct of the trial. Finding
that the state trial judge's failure to adequately protect the defendant from such inherently
prejudicial publicity and maintain order in the courtroom constituted a violation of due
process, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction.
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Finally, it is arguable that the use of prior conviction evidence
runs afoul of the fifth amendment because it forces the defendant
to choose between two fundamental rights-his right to testify54
and his privilege against self-incrimination. 55 By testifying, a de-
fendant may substantially reduce his chances of acquittal. To avoid
incriminating himself, therefore, he may be forced to remain silent.
The rule seems to preclude the exercise of one right without
detriment to the other.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has never ruled on the use of
prior convictions or criminal acts to impeach the credibility of a
defendant witness. Indeed, in such cases, certiorari has been consis-
tently denied.56 In analogous situations, the Court has held that the
jury's knowledge of a defendant's record, although perhaps prej-
udicial, did not rise to the level of a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights. For example, in Michelson v. United States,57
the Court ruled that cross-examination of a character witness for
the defense concerning the defendant's arrest 27 years earlier was
not improper. In Spencer v. Texas, 8 the Court upheld the state
recidivist procedure which permitted the full disclosure of the
defendant's record to the jury. A limiting instruction that the prior
record was to be used for sentencing purposes only was considered
sufficient to protect the defendant's rights. 59 Finally, in Murphy v.
Florida,60 although jurors had knowledge of the defendant's prior
record from newspaper stories and admitted to some prejudice
against the defendant, the Court concluded that the constitutional
requirements of a fair trial had been met.
54 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
"See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
6 See, e.g., De Angelis v. United States, 416 U.S. 956, denying cert. to 490 F.2d 1004 (2d
Cir. 1974); Cook v. United States, 406 U.S. 925 (1972), denying cert. to 450 F.2d 339 (5th Cir.
1971); DiLorenzo v. United States, 402 U.S. 950 (1971), denying cert. to 429 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.
1970); Allison v. United States, 396 U.S. 968, denying cert. to 414 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1969);
Morefield v. United States, 396 U.S. 916, denying cert. to 411 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1969);
Palumbo v. United States, 394 U.S. 947 (1969), denying cert. to 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968);
Pinkney v. United States, 390 U.S. 908 (1968), denying cert. to 380 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967);
Plata v. United States, 385 U.S. 841, denying cert. to 361 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1966).
Z7 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
58 385 U.S. 554 (1969).
59 In a strong dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Warren, with whom Justice Fortas
concurred, expressed disapproval of the procedure that permitted the jury to know of the
defendant's prior record before reaching their verdict where such record was to be used
only to determine the sentenci. Notably, however, the Justices distinguished this situation
from one where evidence of prior convictions is used to impeach a defendant's credibility,
commenting that "prior-convictions evidence introduced for certain specific purposes relat-
ing to the determination of guilt or innocence ... would not violate the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 578 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The admission of prior conviction evidence is proper in
the case of impeachment, they stated, since it is relevant to credibility and thus to the jury's
determination of guilt or innocence.
60 421 U.S. 907 (1975).
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In light of these decisions, it is conceivable that, if faced with
the issue of the permissible scope of impeachment against a defen-
dant witness, the Supreme Court would sanction a broad range of
'impeachment procedures. Since the Court has indicated, however,
that it is "not the best forum for developing rules of evidence," 6' it
is more likely that the present hands-off policy will continue. Not-
withstanding the Court's position that the jury's knowledge of a
defendant's prior record does not, in analogous situations, neces-
sarily amount to a violation of his constitutional rights, perhaps the
Court's refusal to finally resolve the issue will enable state courts




Defenders of the procedures permitting impeachment by evi-
dence of prior convictions or criminal acts assert that the limiting
instruction effectively protects the defendant against any resultant
prejudicial effects. The typical limiting instruction calls attention to
the prosecutor's introduction of prior conviction evidence and ex-
plains that the evidence may be used only in considering the be-
lievability of the witness.6 3 In practice, however, the limiting in-
struction has proved to be an all but useless device for minimizing
prejudice and has been recognized as such by judges64 and com-
61 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563 (1967).
62 As one state court noted: "Nothing prevents our constitutional drafters from fashion-
ing greater protections for criminal defendants than those given by the United States
Constitution." State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 265, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971) (emphasis
added).
'3 The following is a limiting instruction applicable to any defense witness:
The People have produced proof that the witness, , called to the stand by the
defendant, had previously been convicted of a felony. This evidence was admitted
solely to aid you in considering his believability, and to determine the weight to be
given the testimony of that witness. You must not consider this evidence of the
witness's prior conviction for any other purpose, or permit it otherwise to influence
you with respect to your verdict or determination.
You may also consider the nature of the crime of which he was convicted. The
fact that a man has been convicted of a crime does not automatically make him
unworthy of belief. But if it is a crime which involves his capacity to be truthful,
such as perjury or fraud, or one which would normally and reasonably make you
believe that he is not to be trusted to tell the truth, you may apply that fact, with
others, to your determination of whether you will believe his testimony, and to what
extent.
Form No. 27, in 1 J. DoWSEY, CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO CHARGE IN A
CRIMINAL CASE 3-30 (1968).
64 See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury . .. all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."); United States v. Banmiller,
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mentators65 alike. It is unrealistic to assume that the decisionmak-
ing process is so compartmentalized as to enable a jury to decide
the issues of credibility and guilt independently. Indeed, the in-
struction may even emphasize the fact of prior conviction, and for
this reason many defense attorneys prefer that the charge not be
given at all.6 6 Far from being protective of a defendant, therefore,
the limiting instruction only enhances the prejudicial effect that
this kind of evidence has on the minds of the jurors.
AN ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM-
A LOOK AT Sandoval AND Duffy
The problems surrounding the procedures for impeachment
of a defendant witness - the resulting prejudice, the constitutional
objections, the ineffectiveness of the limiting instruction - have
been particularly critical in New York, a jurisdiction that has tradi-
tionally allowed a wide range of criminal convictions and acts to be
introduced at trial. 67 Recently, an increased sensitivity to many of
these problems began to develop in the lower courts. In recogni-
tion of this trend, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v.
Sandova 6 8 and People v. Duffy, 69 attempted to alleviate some of the
worst effects of the impeachment rule.
310 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1962) (Where the jury was charged to consider 25 prior
convictions only in regard to sentencing and not with regard to the issue of guilt, the court
commented that "[c]ertainly such a feat of psychological wizardry verges on the impossible
even for berobed judges.'); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1956)
(dissenting opinion) ("Such a cautionary instruction is a kind of judicial lie."); Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Here the court characterized the limiting instruc-
tion as "[tihe device which satisfies form while it violates substance; that is, the recommenda-
tion to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's
else [sic].').
"See Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REv. 264,
282-83 (1966) ("Other crimes' evidence must either be totally excluded, or admitted with the
understanding that the jury probably will not be able to circumscribe its use of the evi-
dence.').See also Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 184-91 (1940).66 See Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction
Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant-Witness, 37 U. CiNN. L.
REV. 168, 172 n.25 (1968).
One commentator has suggested dealing with the problem of prejudice by allowing the
judge to interrupt cross-examination to instruct the jury as to the limited purpose of prior
conviction evidence. The judge would then reiterate the instruction at the close of the case.
Katz, Cross-Examination of the Defendant in Criminal Trials-Impeachment Limits, 173 N.Y.L.J.
61, Mar. 31, 1975, at 1, col. 1. A defense attorney, however, would probably shudder at such
a tactic since it appears to further emphasize the fact of prior conviction to the jury.67 See text accompanying notes 12-34 supra.
68 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974), aff'g 337 N.Y.S.2d 994 (2d
Dep't 1972) (mem.), noted in 41 B'KLYN L. REV. 665 (1975) and 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 168 (1975).
69 36 N.Y.2d 258, 326 N.E.2d 804, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1975), aff'g 44 App. Div. 2d 298,
354 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1974).
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People v. Sandoval
Sandoval, who was indicted for common law murder, had a
lengthy criminal record available for impeachment purposes. 70 His
attorney made a pretrial motion requesting the court to prohibit
use of the defendant's record on cross-examination. The trial court
ruled that evidence of defendant's two prior convictions, one for
disorderly conduct and the other for assault, was admissible for
impeachment purposes. 7' Upon conviction, Sandoval appealed the
ruling to the appellate division, but that court found no abuse of
discretion by the trial court. 72 The murder conviction was again
affirmed by the court of appeals, which also indicated that the
pretrial motion is the proper vehicle for the judge's evidentiary
ruling and set down guidelines governing the types of acts or
convictions to be admitted on cross-examination.
The court's first proposal was that the trial judge employ a
balancing test, used in a number of other jurisdictions, 73 pursuant
to which
a balance must . . . be struck between the probative worth of
evidence of prior specific criminal, vicious or immoral acts on the
issue of the defendant's credibility on the one hand, and on the
other the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, measured
both by the impact of such evidence if it is admitted after his
testimony and by the effect its probable introduction may have in
discouraging him from taking the stand on his own behalf.74
10 Sandoval's record included convictions for disorderly conduct (1964), assault in the
third degree (1965), and driving while intoxicated (1963 and 1965). He had been charged
with contributing to the delinquency of a minor (1960) and gambling (1967), but these
charges did not result in convictions. Also on record were a 1965 arrest for felonious assault,
which resulted in dismissal, and a 1965 traffic violation. 34 N.Y.2d at 373, 314 N.E.2d at
415, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
71 Id.
,
2 See 337 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
71 One of the earliest and most widely cited formulations of this test appeared in Luck v.
United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The Luck court stated that sound judicial
discretion should intervene where it would be preferable to let the jury hear the defendant's
story rather than have the defendant remain silent or where the probative value of the prior
conviction in regard to credibility is far outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence.
Id. at 768. For some interesting comments on Luck by Judge McGowan, the author of the
opinion, see McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 L. & Soc.
ORD. 1.
Notably, the Luck formula has been approved by the Second Circuit. See United States v.
Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 947 (1969).
74 34 N.Y.2d at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 854. For examples of pre-
Sandoval formulations of the balancing test in the lower courts of New York, see People v.
Duffy, 44 App. Div. 2d 298, 354 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 326
N.E.2d 804, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1975); People v. McCleaver, 78 Misc. 2d 48, 354 N.Y.S.2d
847 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974); and People v. King, 72 Misc. 2d 540, 339 N.Y.S.2d 358
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1972).
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As articulated, this test appears to imply an equal balance between
the rights of the defendant and the interests of the state. The court
seems to have allowed the scale to be tipped against the defendant
at the outset, however, by noting that impeachment evidence will
always be detrimental and prejudicial. And rather than recognize
the prejudicial effect of such evidence as an evil to be avoided, it
readily accepted the propensity of such evidence to influence the
jury as "inevitable."' 75
The court proceeded to outline in greater detail the types of
acts that may or may not be admissible. 76 Acts of impulsive vio-
lence, especially those remote in time, or crimes resulting from
addiction or uncontrollable habit would have limited relevance to
credibility. In addition, traffic infractions, the court noted, should
almost always be excluded. On the other hand, crimes involving
dishonesty, especially perjury, because of their great probative
value in determining a defendant's credibility, would almost always
be admissible. Acts tending to show criminal propensity would be
inadmissible, however, despite their relevance, because of their
strong prejudicial effect upon a jury.
In discussing these specific types of acts it characterized as
admissible or inadmissible, the court enunciated a second test to
guide judicial discretion:
To the extent, however, that the prior commission of a particular
crime of calculated violence or of specified vicious or immoral
acts significantly revealed a willingness or disposition on the part
of the particular defendant voluntarily to place the advancement
of his individual self-interest ahead of principle or of the inter-
ests of society, proof thereof may be relevant to suggest his
readiness to do so again on the witness stand.77
This second test is substantially different from the first and has no
prior history in case law. The use of such terms as "principle,"
"interests of society," and "individual self-interest" is vague, confus-
ing, and susceptible to many different interpretations.78 Moreover,
the test would seem to be distinctly unfavorable to the defendant to
the extent that all crimes may be said to reflect selfish motives.
75 34 N.Y.2d at 376, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
76 1d. at 376-78, 314 N.E.2d at 417-18, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56.
77Id. at 377, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
7See Prince, Evidence, 1974 Survey of N.Y. Law, 26 SYR. L. REv. 423 (1975). Notwith-
standing his approval of the Sandoval decision, the author commented that "[i]t is difficult,
however, to determine precisely what the Court of Appeals had in mind" when it formulated
the self-interest test. Id. at 425 n.15.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the test fails to consider the
prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence on the jury.
It is submitted that the two tests articulated in Sandoval con-
fuse, rather than clarify, the substantive issues involved. One must
look to the holding of the case to discover which test is in fact
controlling. The admission of prior convictions for disorderly con-
duct and assault would be unjustified under the balancing test,
since remote incidents of this type have little relevance to credibility
and are highly prejudicial to the defendant. On the other hand,
these two offenses, like all criminal acts, do demonstrate a certain
disregard for the interests of society. It appears, therefore, that the
court, in admitting both the disorderly conduct and assault convic-
tions chose to apply only the self-interest test, thereby allowing the
jury to gauge the defendant's credibility on the basis of acts that
had little or no bearing on his tendency to lie on the stand.
Far from being innovative, the Sandoval decision appears to-
tally consistent with the then existing New York case law permitting
the almost unlimited use of prior convictions to impeach. Part of
Sandoval's record which was suppressed would have been inadmis-
sible in any event under that case law.7 9 Furthermore, the admissi-
bility of Sandoval's disorderly conduct conviction is an example of
the much criticized broad scope of impeachment earlier approved
by the third department in People v. Gray.80 Thus, while much of
the language in Sandoval seems to favor a more narrow scope of
impeachment, the actual facts of the case appear to condone a very
extensive use of a defendant witness' prior record.
A further ambiguity in the decision results from the terms
used to describe the prior incidents in the defendant's record.
Although the Sandoval court, throughout its opinion, speaks of
cross-examination concerning prior criminal, vicious, or immoral
acts 8 the holding of the case related to the defendant's prior
convictions as well as prior criminal acts. Nowhere does the court
even mention prior convictions as a separate category of admissible
impeachment evidence. It is uncertain, therefore, whether or not
79 An arrest not resulting in conviction has never been available to the prosecution as
impeaching evidence. See note 20 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, traffic infractions
are traditionally inadmissible. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
80 41 App. Div. 2d 125, 341 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dep't 1973). Within a few days of the
Sandoval decision, Gray was indeed affirmed by the court of appeals. 34 N.Y.2d 903, 316
N.E.2d 719, 359 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1974) (mem.). The critical reception given Gray is discussed
in note 31 supra.
81 34 N.Y.2d at 371, 373, 376, 314 N.E.2d at 413, 415, 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 849, 852,
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the court intended to abolish the distinction between these two
methods of impeachment.
The opinion of the court was quite clear, however, with respect
to the procedural issue. It unequivocally approved the use of a
pretrial motion to give both prosecution and defense advance
notice of the scope of cross-examination and, more importantly, to
aid the defendant in deciding whether to take the stand or remain
silent.8 2 In rare instances the court may, in its discretion, order an
evidentiary hearing on the motion. In such cases the defendant
may submit supporting affidavits or appear in person. 83 Prior to
Sandoval a few lower courts had allowed such a motion before trial
on a purely discretionary basis.84 Sandoval now authorizes its use as
a routine part of pretrial procedure.
People v. Duffy
Use of the pretrial motion as the vehicle for securing a ruling
on the scope of cross-examination was reaffirmed by the court of
appeals in People v. Duffy.85 Duffy, however, added to the confusion
engendered by the Sandoval decision regarding the method of
determining the specific convictions or acts of misconduct which
are admissible to impeach the defendant.
On trial for the alleged commission of robbery and grand
larceny, the defendant in Duffy was questioned on cross-
examination regarding his previous use of heroin.86 Ruling that the
cross-examination was proper, the court of appeals reasoned that
"[t]he [defendant's] responses evinced a 'demonstrated determina-
tion deliberately to further self-interest at the expense of society'
and went to 'honesty and integrity.' "87 No mention was made of
the Sandoval balancing test which requires the court to weigh the
value of the evidence sought to be introduced against the prejudi-
cial effect on the defendant.88 Nor did the court refer to the21Id. at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 416, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 854. While in most cases the motion is
to be made prior to trial, the court left open the possibility that the issue might also be
considered during the trial itself.
5 Id.
See People v. Duffy, 44 App. Div. 2d 298, 354 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd, 36
N.Y.2d 258, 326 N.E.2d 804, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1975); People v. Piranian, 77 Misc. 2d 441,
354 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974); People v. Wilson, 75 Misc. 2d 471, 347
N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1973).But see People v. Palmeri, 58 Misc. 2d 288, 295
N.Y.S.2d 128 (Oneida County Ct. 1968) (pretrial motion to enjoin the district attorney from
using prior convictions to impeach the defendant is premature).
85 36 N.Y.2d at 263, 326 N.E.2d at 807, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
"'
6 d. at 261-62, 326 N.E.2d at 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 239.8 7 1d. at 262, 326 N.E.2d at 806-07, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 240, quoting People v. Sandoval, 34
N.Y.2d 371, 377, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 855 (1974).
s8 See text accompanying notes 73-75 supra.
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Sandoval concept that "crimes or conduct occasioned by addiction
or uncontrollable habit . . .may have lesser probative value as to
lack of in-court veracity. 89
In the trial court, Duffy had also been questioned about a
youthful offender adjudication involving an assault.90 The court of
appeals disposed of this issue briefly, mentioning that while evi-
dence of the youthful offender conviction was inadmissible, the
underlying act could be the subject of cross-examination. 9 ' It ap-
pears from this ruling that the Duffy court gave little consider-
ation to the defendant's age at the time of this conviction or to the
Sandoval court's observation that acts of violence seldom have a
bearing on credibility at trial. 92
There appears to be little doubt that Duffy represents a retreat
from the halfhearted attempt of the Sandoval court to limit the
scope of cross-examination of a defendant witness for impeach-
ment purposes. Duffy's concentration on the broad self-interest test
of Sandoval, to the exclusion of the balancing test, indicates that the
court does not seriously intend to curtail the scope of impeachment
and for all practical purposes leaves the old law unchanged. While
the court has given the defendant a procedural advantage in the
pretrial motion, his ultimate dilemma seems as serious as ever.
Should he choose to testify, he is vulnerable to impeachment by an
almost full range of prior convictions or criminal acts. Admittedly,
such impeachment is scrutinized by the trial court, but in the
absence of more specific limitations on the use of impeaching
evidence against a defendant witness, it is submitted that the insur-
ance against a court's abuse of its discretion is inadequate.
The Aftermath of Sandoval
The Sandoval decision has understandably created more than a
little confusion in the lower courts. While the advance ruling on the
admissiblity of prior convictions and criminal acts appears to have
been quickly integrated into routine pretrial procedure, the courts
are sharply divided on the substantive issues involved.
89 36 N.Y.2d at 377, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56.
90 See 44 App. Div. 2d at 304, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
91 36 N.Y.2d at 264, 326 N.E.2d at 807-08, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
92 See 34 N.Y.2d at 376-77, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855, wherein the
Sandoval court acknowledged that "[t]he commission of an act of violence, particularly if
remote in time, will seldom have any logical bearing on the defendant's credibility, veracity,
or honesty at the time of the trial."
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The Pretrial Motion
Use of the pretrial motion has been uniformly adopted by the
lower courts93 so that every defendant is now afforded the oppor-
tunity to secure an advance ruling as to the admissiblity of im-
peachment evidence against him. As a result, the lower courts have
now begun to focus on the development of specific procedures to
be followed. For example, whereas the Sandoval court recom-
mended that the motion for a ruling on the permissible scope of
cross-examination be made at some point prior to trial, the Appel-
late Division, Second Department, has further indicated that such
determination should be made promptly and well in advance of the
time a defendant must choose whether or not to testify.9 4 One
court has also granted the defendant the right to secure a copy of
his police record to aid him in preparing his motion papers. 95
Although Sandoval's requirement that the evidentiary ruling be
made by the "trial court '96 has been interpreted to mean that the
trial judge himself should make the determination, 97 it has also
been considered proper for any judge of the court where the trial
will be held to rule on a defendant's Sandoval motion.98 The
applicability of Sandoval to grand jury proceedings has also been
discussed, but not resolved. One court found "no legal justification
or rational basis" for limiting Sandoval only to defendants on trial,99
3 See, e.g., People v. Law, 48 App. Div. 2d 228, 368 N.Y.S.2d 627 (4th Dep't 1975);
People v. Kenchik, 47 App. Div. 2d 907, 366 N.Y.S.2d 471 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.); People v.
President, 47 App. Div. 2d 535, 363 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1975); People v. Bullock, 45
App. Div. 2d 902, 357 N.Y.S.2d 722 (3d Dep't 1974) (mem.); People v. Jackson, 79 Misc. 2d
814, 361 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974) (mem.); People v. Mallard, 78 Misc.
2d 858, 358 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974) (mem.).
'4 People v. Kenchik, 47 App. Div. 2d 907, 366 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (2d Dep't 1975)
(mem.) (dictum).
5 In re Legal Aid Soc'y v. Mallon, 47 App. Div. 2d 646, 364 N.Y.S.2d 17 (2d Dep't
1975).
9 34 N.Y.2d at 375, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
'7 People v. Mallard, 78 Misc. 2d 858, 859, 358 N.Y.S.2d 913, 914 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1974) (mem.).
91 Disagreeing with the literal approach taken by the Supreme Court, Queens County,
see id., the court in People v. Allah, 81 Misc. 2d 694, 366 N.Y.S.2d 582 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct.
N.Y. County 1975), determined that it was proper for any judge of the court having
jurisdiction over the trial to consider the defendant's pretrial motion. In support of this
interpretation the court noted that the "Court of Appeals was no doubt cognizant of the fact
that many, if not most, pretrial motions in the Criminal Court of the City of New York take
place in the Calendar or All Purpose Parts, particularly those motions that may require
hearings," and consequently it could not have intended to mean the specific trial judge. Id at
695, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
'9 People v. Hargrove, 80 Misc. 2d 317, 327, 363 N.Y.S.2d 241, 250 (Sup. Ct. Westches-
ter County 1975). The defendant was indicted for two narcotics offenses by a grand jury
before which he had been cross-examined concerning two 10-year-old drug convictions. The
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while another court has ruled that the impeachment of witnesses in
grand jury proceedings is within the discretion of the district attor-
ney alone, who need give no advance notice of the scope of his
cross-examination.100
To date no court has addressed the issue of the specific con-
tent of the Sandoval motion papers. 1' Prior convictions on record
are available to both prosecution and defense. It is clear from
Duffy, however, that the Sandoval procedure also applies to im-
peachment by evidence of vicious, criminal, or immoral acts.' 0 2
Nevertheless, the court failed to specify whether the burden falls
exclusively on the defendant, who is now required to make the
motion, to spell out every act of misconduct in his past history or
whether the prosecution must also come forward with the evidence
it possesses. A more equitable solution might be to require the
prosecutor to make a Sandoval motion and preclude him from
offering at trial evidence of specific acts of misconduct not con-
tained therein. Another problem arises from the lack of safeguards
to prevent the prosecution from gaining knowledge of the defen-
dant's past criminal conduct from the motion papers, information
that otherwise might never have come to light. Perhaps the defen-
dant should be permitted to reveal to the judge only, and not to the
prosecutor, any specific criminal acts not part of his official record
of convictions. Although the appropriate content of the Sandoval
motion papers will inevitably have to be determined, no court has
as yet addressed these problems.
Prior Criminal Acts and Convictions
The pronounced lack of agreement among lower courts on the
standards to be used to guide the judge's exercise of discretion
court regarded the introduction of prior convictions to be especially prejudicial in this case
in view of the numerous inconsistencies in the testimony presented by both sides. The court
ruled therefore that since the "prosecutor had knowingly and deliberately put this incitive
material before the grand jury in violation of the reason and spirit of the Sandoval doctrine,"
the indictment should be dismissed. Id. at 328, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
100 In People v. Adams, 81 Misc. 2d 528, 366 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1975), the court denied defendant's motion for an advance ruling restraining the district
attorney from cross-examining him before the grand jury concerning his prior criminal
record. Observing that the United States Supreme Court has held that a grand jury should
not be delayed so that suppression hearings could be held, the court reasoned that the same
considerations of expediency and judicial economy should control in this case. Id. at 531, 366
N.Y.S.2d at 314, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) and United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
101See 3 HOFSTRtA L. REv. 168, 176 (1975), in which the author comments on the
Sandoval court's failure to delineate the specific content of the pretrial motion papers.
102 The Duffy court permitted cross-examination of the defendant concerning his al-
leged prior history of heroin use, despite the absence of drug-related convictions on the
defendant's record. 36 N.Y.2d at 261-62, 326 N.E.2d at 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
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indicates that Sandoval and Duffy have accomplished little in the
way of clarification of the substantive problems associated with
impeachment of a defendant witness. The trend in the Appellate
Division, Second Department, appears to be in favor of limiting
cross-examination of the defendant to convictions or criminal acts
having a direct bearing on credibility. Very remote convictions
have been ruled inadmissible, especially where there was a danger
that the evidence was going to be used to demonstrate criminal
propensity.' 0 3 In People v. Jackson,'0 4 the court seized upon the
broad language in Sandoval to establish definite categories of ad-
missible and inadmissible criminal convictions and acts. 10 5 Thus,
the court ruled that cross-examination concerning traffic offenses,
because of their immateriality, and convictions more than 10-
years-old, because of their remoteness, should be barred al-
together. Convictions linked to addiction or uncontrollable habit
were similarly recognized to be of little probative value in deter-
mining credibility. The Jackson court further recommended that,
due to the great danger of prejudice, convictions similar or identi-
cal to the crime charged be used sparingly. With respect to youth-
ful offender adjudications, the court noted that in most cases evi-
dence of the underlying act as well as evidence of the conviction
itself should be excluded. In sum, the Jackson court determined
that only those crimes involving individual dishonesty or un-
trustworthiness have such a direct relation to credibility as to over-
ride the prejudice that inevitably arises from their use to impeach a
defendant. 0 6 Thus the court barred the prosecution from explor-
ing both the convictions and the underlying acts relating to the
defendant's narcotics offenses. 10 7
103 See, e.g., People v. President, 47 App. Div. 2d 535, 363 N.Y.S.2d 612 (2d Dep't 1975).
The court refused to sanction the admission of evidence of the defendant's 30-year-old man-
slaughter conviction on the theory that it was too remote to have any relevance to credibility
and too likely to have an adverse effect on the jury.
114 79 Misc. 2d 814, 361 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974) (mem.).
105Id. at 816-18, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 261-63.1
'Id. at 816-17, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 262. In People v. Mallard, 78 Misc. 2d 858, 358
N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974), another judge had limited admissible convic-
tions to those for "perjury, fraud and deceit, larceny by misrepresentation and other closely
related crimes which have at their very core the prior dishonest or untruthful quality of the
defendant." Id. at 864-65, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (emphasis in original). In Mallard, the defen-
dant's entire criminal record of nine convictions was suppressed.
1779 Misc. 2d at 818, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 263. The Jackson court admitted, however,
evidence of the defendant's convictions for attempted criminal possession of stolen property
and possession of weapons.
Even where the defendant's prior convictions meet the relevancy criteria set forth in
Jackson, in some situations part of the record may nevertheless be excluded. For example, in
People v. Utley, 173 N.Y.LJ. 47, Mar. 11, 1975, at 18, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Queens County),
evidence of the defendant's prior convictions for attempted possession of stolen property,
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Far less liberal in their interpretations of the Sandoval decision
are the Third and Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division.
Decisions from these courts lend strong support to the view that
the law has undergone no real change. The third department has
adopted very strict standards for appellate review of decisions
concerning the grant of a Sandoval hearing or the permissible scope
of impeachment. For example, in People v. Bullock'"8 the court
indicated that the trial court's determination should rarely be upset
since Sandoval issues are "subject to the sound discretion of the
Trial Judge and best determined by him."' 10 9
The fourth department in People v. Law 10 permitted cross-
examination concerning a burglary charge that was reduced to
petit larceny as well as reference to an arrest that never resulted
in conviction. While inquiry into prior arrests had not even been
permitted before the court of appeals decided Sandoval,"' the
prosecutor's references to the defendant's arrest for the sale of
drugs were excused on the ground that they were merely inciden-
tal to legitimate questioning about prior acts of misconduct." 2
Perhaps most significant was the fourth department's observation
that Sandoval "does not change the substantive law in this respect
even though it gives opportunity to limit such use by the vehicle of
a pretrial motion." 3
CONCLUSION
Whileinitially hailed as a solution to the dilemma of the de-
fendant witness, the Sandoval decision seems to have created as
many problems as it has solved. Sandoval is highly innovative in-
sofar as it establishes a new procedure allowing a defendant to gain
an advance ruling on the scope of the cross-examination that will
be permitted should he take the stand at trial. The pretrial motion
has been uniformly accepted by the lower courts, and any fears
that it would increase the already overwhelming backlog in our
criminal courts" 14 have proved unfounded." 5
possession of stolen property, and attempted grand larceny was excluded by the court. The
judge feared that the introduction of the defendant's entire record, containing numerous
convictions, would be interpreted by the jury as evidence of criminal propensity.
108 45 App. Div. 2d 902, 357 N.Y.S.2d 722 (3d Dep't 1974) (mem.).
109 Id. at 902, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
11048 App. Div. 2d 228, 368 N.Y.S.2d 627 (4th Dep't 1975).
111 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
11248 App. Div. 2d at 234, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
113 Id. at 235, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
1 14 See 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 168, 176 (1975).
115 Interview with Judge Richard E. Edstrom, District Court of Nassau County, Mineola,
New York, in chambers, July 15, 1975.
[Vol. 50:129
DILEMMA OF DEFENDANT WITNESS
The procedure at this stage is fairly informal, and the motion
can be made at any time prior to trial. In conformity with the trend
to expedite pretrial procedures, the Sandoval motion and hearing
could easily be incorporated into the omnibus pretrial motion re-
cently adopted in New York 1 6 and successfully utilized in other
jurisdictions. 1 7 Attorneys have already anticipated legislative ac-
tion in this regard by submitting the Sandoval motion along with
the other papers required to be submitted in the omnibus mo-
tion."18
Regrettably, the substantive problems with. Sandoval remain.
In the absence of clear and definitive judicial guidelines, the lower
courts are sharply divided as to the types of prior convictions and
vicious, criminal, and immoral acts that are admissible. The am-
biguity of the language in Sandoval and the use of the self-interest
test, which is so broad as to be all but meaningless, have produced,
rather than solved, a multitude of problems.
Hopefully, the New York Court of Appeals will soon rectify
the situation and definitively limit the scope of impeachment. It is
submitted that the approach of the second department best exem-
plifies the spirit of the Sandoval ruling and therefore should be
adopted. Criminal acts that reflect on the honesty or trustworthi-
ness of the witness should be admissible. Acts of violence, incidents
that occurred during the defendant's youth, or very remote acts of
misconduct have little bearing on the defendant's credibility and
should accordingly be excluded. The defendant has been given the
benefit of an advance ruling on the range of permissible impeach-
ment. Now the trial court should also be given a set of firm
standards to govern that ruling and protect the defendant's right to
a fair trial and an impartial jury.
Joanne T. Marren
116 N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 255.10 (McKinney Supp. 1975). Motions to dismiss accusa-
tory instruments, obtain discovery and bills of particulars, remove actions, obtain separate
trials, and suppress evidence must all be included in the omnibus pretrial motion. Id.
Adoption of the procedure has been universally approved as promoting fairness and judicial
economy. See 20 N.Y. JUD. CONF. ANN. REP. 236 (1975); 19 N.Y. JUD. CONF. ANN. REP.
A73-74 (1974); L. PAPERNO & A. GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK § 213 (1975
Cum. Supp.).117 See Clark, The Omnibus Hearing in State and Federal Courts, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 761
(1974); Peterson, Omnibus Hearings in Criminal Cases in North Dakota Federal District Court, 49
N.D.L. REv. 537 (1973); Van Sickle, The Omnibus Pretrial Conference, 50 N.D.L. REv. 178
(1973).
118 Interview with Judge Richard E. Edstrom, District Court of Nassau County, Mineola,
New York, in chambers, July 15, 1975.
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